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RECENT DECISIONS
CORFORATIONS-STATUTES PROVIDING FOR BOTH CUMULATIVE VOTING AND
CLASSIFIED BoARDs-The shareholders of the Winous Company amended the
articles of incorporation to provide for staggered elections whereby one
of the three directors would be elected each year to serve a three-year term.
The Ohio Code provides for classified boards,' and contains a guarantee of
the right to vote cumulatively which is not to be restricted by the articles
of incorporation.2 The county court of appeals reversed the court of
common pleas and held the amendment invalid because it nullified the
I "The articles of the code of regulations may provide for the term of office of all of
the directors or, if classified upon the basis of the expiration of the terms of office of the
directors, of each class thereof...." Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1953) §1701.640.
2"... Each shareholder shall have the right to cumulate such voting power as he
possesses.... [S]uch right to vote cumulatively shall not be restricted or qualified by the
articles or the code of regulations." Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1953) §1701.580.
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right to vote cumulatively. They interpreted the cumulative voting pro-
vision as specific and therefore a limitation on the more general section
authorizing staggered elections.8  Held, reversed. Where there are con-
tradictory provisions in two statutes and both are susceptible of a reasonable
construction which will nullify neither, it is the duty of the court to give
such construction. The section guaranteeing the right of cumulative
voting does not guarantee the effectiveness of that right to insure minority
representation on the board. Humphreys v. Winous Co., 165 Ohio St. 45,
133 N.E. (2d) 780 (1956).
Several states provide for mandatory cumulative voting by statute,
while others provide for it by constitutional provision, and still others have
permissive statutes whereby cumulative voting may be provided for in the
articles or by-laws of a corporation if the stockholders so desire. Likewise,
a majority of the states have by legislative enactment sanctioned classified
boards.4 Prior to 1955 there were only two cases which discussed the effect
of the classification of boards of directors on cumulative voting, and neither
of these cases passed directly on the matter.5 Wolfson v. Avery6 was the
first case to deal directly with conflicting provisions, and gave precedence
to a constitutional provision over a statute.7 The principal case is the first
to construe conflicting and contemporaneous statutes. The court's decision
makes it clear that classified boards are not necessarily precluded by cumu-
lative voting provisions.8 A particular difficulty was presented by the
principal case in that the effect of cumulative voting was entirely negated
where only one director was to be elected. The Ohio Legislature, however,
remedied this situation after this case was decided by'providing that only
3 57 Ohio Op. 44, 125 N.E. (2d) 204 (1955).
4 For complete citations to the legislation in this area see 24 UNIV. CQ. L. Rlv. 560
(1955). For construction of these statutes and constitutional provisions see annotation in
43 A.L.R. (2d) 1322 (1955).
5 Pittsburgh Steel Co. v. Walker, 92 Pitts. L.J. 464 (Court of Common Pleas, Alle-
gheny County, 1944); Cohen v. Byers Co., (Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County,
1950), affd. per curiam, 363 Pa. 618, 70 A. (2d) 837 (1950).
6 6 I1. (2d) 78, 126 N.E. (2d) 701 (1955). See 22 UNIV. CH. L. Rv. 751 (1955); 24
UNIV. CrN. L. REv. 560 (1955); 60 DIcK. L. REv. 185 (1956); 69 HARv. L. Rav. 380 (1955);
1955 UNIV. ILL. L. FORUM 316 (1955); 43 ILL. B.J. 807 (1955); 7 MRcER L. REv. 227 (1955);
9 MIAMI L.Q. 365 (1955); 50 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 112 (1955); 103 UMv. PA. L. REv. 822
(1955); Sell and Fuge, "Impact of Classified Corporate Directorates on the Constitutional
Right of Cumulative Voting," 17 UNIV. Prrr. L. REv. 151 (1956); 30 ST. JOHNS L. REv. 83
(1955); 41 VA. L. REv. 809 (1955); 1 WAYNE L. REv. 217 (1955).
7 It had been held previously that the privilege of cumulative voting could be abol-
ished only by authority equal to that which conferred the privilege. Thus, a statutory
privilege could not be vitiated by a corporate resolution. Tomlin v. Farmers & Merchants
Bank, 52 Mo. App. 430 (1893). Cf. Maddock v. Vorclone Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 39, 147 A. 255
(1929) (under permissive statute the, right to vote can be taken away by properly amend-
ing the charter); Wright v. Central Cal. Colony Water Co., 67 Cal. 532, 8 P. 70 (1885)
(mandatory cumulative privilege cannot be nullified by a majority resolution providing
for separate ballots for each director).
8 See MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATONS AcT §§31, 35 (1950), prepared by the Committee
on Business Corporations of the American Bar Association, providing for both the manda-
tory right of cumulative voting and classification of directors.
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a certain minimum number of directors can comprise a class.9 It should
be noted that classification does not necessarily reduce minority representa-
tion.10 In addition, although the purpose of cumulative voting provisions
is to aid minority stockholders in obtaining representation," they do not
purport to insure minority representation in any event.12 The size of the
board may be legally reduced,'13 and if this is permissible, classification
into groups no smaller than the minimum number of directors allowed
should certainly be unobjectionable in any case. Also, many states permit
removal without cause,14 so it is clear that the minority's right to repre-
sentation is not absolute even apart from the effect of classification.
David W. Swanson, S.Ed.
9 Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1955) §1701.57 amended §1701.64 to require that each
class must consist of not less than three directors.
10 In some instances it actually increases it, e.g., 26% of the stockholders could elect
only 2 of 9 directors if all are elected at once, but 3 of 9 if divided into classes of 3. For
various formulae to determine the amount of stock needed to elect a director cumulatively,
see Cole, "Legal and Mathematical Aspects of Cumulative Voting," 2 S.C. L. REV. 225
(1950); WILLAMS, CuMuLA=v VoTiNG Fop Dmacroas (Harvard Business School) (1951).
See also 69 HAnv. L. REv. 380 (1955); Bowes and DeBow, "Cumulative Voting at Election
of Directors of Corporations," 21 MINN. REv. 351 at 362 (1937).
11See In re Jamaica Consumers' Ice Co., 190 App. Div. 739, 180 N.Y.S. 384, affd. 229
N.Y. 516, 129 N.E. 897 (1920); Commonwealth ex tel. O'Shea v. Flannery, 203 Pa. 28, 52
A. 129 (1902).
12 See Maddock v. Vorclone Corp., note 7 supra. For policy arguments for and against
cumulative voting see Young, "Case for Cumulative Voting," 1950 Wis. L. Rav. 49; Axley,
"Case Against Cumulative Voting," 1950 Wis. L. Rv. 278; 56 Dicy. L. Rav. 330 (1952).
Is See Bond v. Atlantic Terra Cotta Co., 137 App. Div. 671, 122 N.Y.S. 425 (1910),
affd. per curiam 210 N.Y. 587, 104 N.E. 1127 (1914). But see Curran, "Minority Stock-
holders and the Amendment of Corporate Charters," 32 MIcH. L. REv. 743 (1934). A
California statute provides that the number of directors cannot be reduced below five
without the consent of more than 80% of the voting power. Cal. Corp. Code Ann. (Deer-
ing, 1953) §501. A Michigan statute prevents reduction of the number of directors where
the dissenting minority would not be able to elect cumulatively the same number of
directors on the reduced board. Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §§450.13, 450.651.
14 But see Matter of Rogers Imports, 202 Misc. 761, 116 N.Y.S. (2d) 106 (1952), noted
in 51 MicH. L. Rlv. 744 (1953), where a charter amendment to provide for cumulative
voting was held to invalidate a by-law providing for removal without cause. Statutes
sometimes prevent removal of a director if there are enough votes against his removal
cumulatively to elect one director, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §450.13. A few statutes
require a two-thirds vote of the capital stock for removal, e.g., S.D. Code (1939) §11.0704.
